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Securities regulation after the 1997 handover
by Amy N N Ang
F or the better part of this century, the world engaged in an ideological duel between two contrasting economic models   the central command economy model and the 
market economy model. The experiment has proved that the 
command model cannot sustain the dynamics of an economy, as 
testified to by the political disintegration of the former Soviet 
Union and the Eastern European countries.
At this point in history, it would seem that the way forward 
for mankind into the next millennium will be the market 
economy or what may also be known as capitalism. There is a 
clear trend around the world to embrace with eagerness the 
market economy for the promise and rewards it brings.
Hong Kong, the 'Pearl of the Orient', is uniquely placed in this 
historic setting, being at the crossroads of both the capitalist world 
and the socialist-communist persuasions of her 'motherland', 
China (as the relationship between Hong Kong and China has 
most commonly been described, in the Chinese rhetorical 
tradition, during the handover period). After British governance 
of over 100 years, Hong Kong subscribes to the laissez-faire 
capitalist economic principle: this non-interventionist approach 
on the part of the government seeks to encourage enterprise in 
which free market competition can be given full reign.
Although Hong Kong is 
not a global financial 
centre in the same league 
as Eondon, New York 
and Tokvo, when 
transferred to Chinese 
rule in 1997 it was the 
second largest 
international financial 
centre in the Asia-Pacific 
region, in addition to 
being the world's fourth 
largest banking centre 
and the sixth or seventh 
largest international 
financial centre. (At the 
end of 1998, the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kongo o o
recorded HK$2,662 
billion market capitalisation, with 680 listed companies; at the 
same time, there were 172 licensed banks, 60 restricted-licence 
banks, 101 deposit-taking companies and 141 local 
representative offices from over 40 countries, including 79 of 
the world's largest 100 banks, with total estimated external 
assets of over US$500 billion.) Thus, ironically, if Hong Kong 
continues to hold her own as an international financial centre as 
a part of Communist China, she will score an economic first by 
being an international financial centre of world standing under 
a socialist-communist regime. Indeed, Hong Kong's position as 
an international financial centre has placed such immense 
importance on its international role in the global economy that
it is specified in the Constitution of Hong Kong, under Art. 1 09 
of the Basic Eaw, that the Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region shall provide:
o 1
'an appropriate economic and legal environment for the maintenance 
oj the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre'.
Hong Kong has a unique advantage, being bulwarked by the 
political principle of 'one country, two systems' conceived by 
the late (and prescient) Chinese premier Deng Xiaopeng. This 
principle is enshrined in Hong Kong's constitution under Art. 5 
of the Basic Eaw, which states that:
'the socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system 
and way of life shall remain unchanged Jbr 50 years'.
Article 5 guarantees that Hong Kong, her autonomy, capitalist 
system, and way of life will not be interfered with by China's 
differing regime, albeit until 2047. It has been reported that 
when someone asked the late Premier as to why a period of 50 
years had been chosen, he said that other financial centres in 
China, such as Shanghai and Shenzhen, would by then have 
attained sufficient maturity in their financial markets to be able 
to hold their own in the financial world.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION
Hong Kong established its first securities exchange in 1891, 
and this was the forerunner to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(so-named only in 1914). In accordance with Hong Kong's 
colonial past, the members of the stock exchange were 
composed of expatriates and the British. Eater, other exchanges 
were set up admitting the local Chinese business community, 
such as the Jockey Club in 1926 and Ear East Stock Exchange in 
1969. The futures industry, on the other hand, existed from 
19 fO to 1977. The Chinese Gold and Silver Exchange Society' 
was the only futures commodity trading exchange in Hong Kong 
and was totally reliant on self-regulation.
The lack of any system of securities regulation meant there 
was no restriction on entry to the financial market. Anyone 
could operate a financial exchange, and nor were there any 
statutory requirements regulating the listing of securities. The 
market in its largely unregulated state lasted until the securities 
market crash of 1973, which caused such hardship that the 
Hong Kong authorities were stirred into legislative action. 
Although so/ne relevant provisions of the Companies Ordinance 
and the Stamp Duty Ordinance existed, the first real foray into 
the regulation of financial markets occurred when the 
Companies (Amendment) Ordinance was passed in 1972 to 
regulate prospectuses of companies.
7973-87
In 1973, the Stock Exchange Control Ordinance was enacted, 
limiting the number of securities exchanges to four: the Hong 29
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Kong Stock Exchange (1891), the Far East Stock Exchange
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(1 969), the Kam Ngan Stock Exchange (1971) and the Kowloon 
Stock Exchange (1973). Similar legislative activity took place in 
the field of commodities futures, with the Commodity Exchange 
(Prohibition) Ordinance restricting the setting up and operating 
of commodities exchanges.
In late 1973 a global securities market crash took place, 
caused by a lack of effective regulation in the financial market. 
Some people lost their life savings as a result and there was 
widespread dissatisfaction against the authority. The government 
reacted to this financial crisis by undertaking concerted reformsJ o
which involved strengthening the financial market structure by 
changing the constitution and management of the exchanges in 
order to make them more accountable to public interests. The 
reforms also gave the exchanges more immediate regulatory 
roles in their respective markets.
The government then began to implement the Securitieso o 1
Ordinance in 1974. Under the ordinance, a regulatory 
framework for the operation of the stock exchange was set up, 
requiring market participants such as dealers, investment 
advisors and representatives to register with the Securities 
Commission. The Commission was also given powers to 
investigate breaches of any financial regulation, including insider 
dealing. A form of investor protection was provided by the Stock 
Exchange Compensation Fund, which was set up to provide 
compensation for clients with defaulting securities firms.
ECONOMIC FIRST
... if Hong Kong continues to hold her own as an international 
financial centre as a part of Communist China, she will score 
an economic first by being an international financial centre of 
world standing under a socialist-communist regime.
In October 1987 a global stock market crash forced the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong to close for an unprecedented four 
working days. This crash once again caused massive hardship 
among the investors. In response, the Securities and Futures 
Commission Ordinance was passed, creating the new Securities 
and Futures Commission ('SFC') with powers of supervision, 
investigation, intervention, prosecution and adjudication. 
Through the SFC many statutes were enacted, such as the 
Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance, an improved version of 
the earlier Securities Ordinance of 1974. In order to prevent 
fraud, disclosure was made compulsory once a shareholder 
acquired more than 10 per cent of a company's shares. The 
Securities (Clearing Houses) Ordinance was enacted, thus giving 
the SFC control over the clearing houses through entry 
restriction and operational procedural stipulations which could 
be set out by the SFC.
In addition, the electronic Central Clearing and Settlement 
System (CCASS) was introduced, which improved the trading 
and settlement systems by providing an efficient and transparent 
system of pricing information.
1997 — the Asian financial crisis
On 1 July 1997 China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong. 
There was much celebration to commemorate this historically 
significant event and a feeling of euphoria over the future of
Hong Kong's continued prosperity. To many the future had 
never seemed brighter, but the day after the handover, before 
many revellers had recovered from their hangovers, the markets 
were rudely awoken to the sobering news of the record 
devaluation of the Thai baht. This financial news sent tremors 
across the neighbouring financial centres in the region. Thailand 
then made the first in a series of overtures from the troubled 
economies in the region to the International Monetary Fund for 
aid (on 28 July 1997, followed by Indonesia on 8 October and 
South Korea on 21 November of the same year).
This news however was followed by assurances from 
government officials of the newly inaugurated Government of 
the Special Administrative Region aimed at allaying fears or 
doubts about Hong Kong's financial standing. In spite of these 
assurances, on IS August 1997 the Hong Kong dollar came 
under severe speculative attacks, causing an overnight interest 
rate hike of 150 points. Because of this, and the fears over high 
interest rates (on 23 October 1997, for example, the overnight 
interbank interest rate at one point rose to 280 per cent under 
the automatic adjustment mechanism of the currency board 
system), the Hong Kong stock market lost approximately a 
quarter of its value in the four days from 20 to 23 October. On 
28 October, the securities and futures markets in Hong Kong 
also saw the most volatile activity in history, with the stock 
market registering a 1,438 points (13.7 per cent) fall in the 
Hang Seng Index, only to rebound the next day to 1,705 points 
(an 18.8 per cent rise).
All Asia stocks continued to plunge until late that year. In 
order to put Hong Kong's volatility in context, and to 
understand the gravity of the situation, it is relevant to compare 
developments in neighbouring economies. Prime Minister 
Mahathir of Malaysia imposed exchange controls and became 
enmeshed in a political scuffle with his deputy prime minister. 
President Suharto was ousted from power as the country was 
plunged into civil and ethnic unrest. In South Korea, households
[ O '
offered their gold jewellery and precious metals to aid the 
government's attempted 'rescue' from bankruptcy and failure. 
The Singapore Government urged its workforce to accept a 
'national' wage reduction across the board. In Hong Kong, 
property prices nose-dived; there was a run on the International 
Bank of Asia, and disappointment at the failure of Hong Kong's 
own financial intermediaries in the Peregrine Group and the CA 
Pacific Group.
It was also in October 1997 that the Special Administrative 
Region Government decided to take an unprecedented step by 
intervening in the market and launching an offensive currency 
defence to the Hong Kong dollar's linked exchange rate with the 
US dollar. Although the government managed successfully to 
beat off the 'speculative rogues', it did not prevent Hong Kong's 
international image as a reliable financial and business centre 
from becoming tarnished.o
The government was at pains to justify its actions to critics 
and the international community. This was certainly an 
uncharacteristic step, as it cut against the laissez-faire non- 
interventionist principle which Hong Kong champions, and at a 
practical level it diminished the foreign reserves. In hindsight, it 
was almost to be expected that the Hong Kong Government 
would act as they did. The official line was to 'safeguard the 
well-being of the economy and the investors' confidence in
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[the] Hong Kong dollar' (Report in the Financial Market Review, 
24 April 1998). However, from a political perspective, the Asian 
financial crisis really did not leave the Special Administrative 
Region Government much of a choice, since not only was theiro J
economy in a state of havoc, but their political mandate and 
credibility as the newly-inaugurated government under Chinese 
rule was at stake. The currency defence was born out of sheer 
political necessity.
THE FORCES OF CHANGE
It is apparent that the Asian financial crisis has mercilessly 
directed the spotlight on what have become glaring inadequacies 
in the financial regulatory system. In the light of this, reforms 
under the new administration take on a regulatory zeal and a 
hitherto absent urgency. But there are also other compelling 
forces at play, which drive the current administration to look at 
this more seriously.
Competition from other markets is very keen, particularly 
Asian emerging markets such as Taipei, Kuala Lumpur (where 
this was especially the case before the exchange controls 
imposed by Prime Minister Mahathir) and Singapore. The
governments of these countries do not belong to the 'hands- et o
off, non-interventionist school and are taking a proactive stance 
in managing their securities and futures industries. Theseo o
energetic and ambitious neighbouring markets are eager to 
exploit their own domestic growth opportunities and keen to 
seize business throughout the recovering Asian region, which is 
showing signs of a recovery ('Asia's bounceback', The Economist, 
Internet Edition, 26 August 1999 Issue). It is easy to predict 
that the countries which will succeed are the ones which 
prepared themselves for the future by passing much-needed 
reforms to the regions' inadequate business rules and, in some 
countries, bringing about a fundamental change in business7 o o o
culture.
Those markets that are implementing reforms are making 
significant changes to their securities and futures industry. They 
are lifting restrictions on outside ownership, opening up their 
markets to international investors and intermediaries, investing 
heavily in new technology to establish cutting-edge systems for 
trading, settlement and clearing, enhancing their securities and 
futures regulatory structures to international standards, dividing 
their exchanges into specialist sector-specific markets, main and 
second boards, and expanding their product ranges to include 
off-shore and regional derivative instruments and debt 
instruments.
It is not only its neighbouring competitors that the Hong 
Kong financial markets must watch out for. Technological 
changes mean that, for example, stocks of major listed 
companies on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong can be traded 
easily in London and also increasingly in New York. 
Furthermore, there are other financial instruments that are even 
less geographically restricted in their trading, such as financial 
and equity-based derivatives.
The impact of technology also challenges the traditional stock 
markets and market regulators since trading can now be 
conducted through electronic exchanges and on-line broking 
houses. Swept up in the tide of haste, the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong has announced that it is aiming to upgrade the 
operating mechanism of its trading system in 2000 to process
authorised trades from the Internet and mobile phones. The 
Bank of International Settlements has forewarned, and rightly 
so, of the dangers of Internet-based trading ('Warning on Net7 o o v o
trading', South China Morning Post, Business, Internet Edition, 26 
August 1999). Internet trading is not as yet a fully developed 
area, so that when for example a system crashes, unresolved legal 
questions arise relating to clearing and settlement issues as to 
who is responsible if a trade or quotation was delayed or 
interrupted.
THE REFORMS
In light of the Asian financial crisis and subsequent 
developments in the world financial markets, the Financial 
Secretary, Donald Tsang, announced in his Budget Speech on 3 
March 1999 an overhaul of Hong Kong's securities and futureso o
market aimed at repositioning Hong Kong's securities and 
futures market for the new millennium. The reform is to be 
undertaken from three perspectives:
  the reorganisation of the market structure through 
demutualisation and merger of the exchanges and clearingo o o
houses;
  legislative reform; and
  the enhancement of the market infrastructure.
DEMUTUALISATIONS AND MERGERS
Under the process of demutualisation and merger, which has 
already achieved some progress, the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong ('SEHK') and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange
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('HKFE'), and their three associating clearing houses   the 
Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company ('HKSCC'), the SEHK 
Options Clearing House ('SEOCH') and the HKFE Clearing 
Corporation ('HKCC')   will be demutualised and merged into 
a single holding company called the Hong Kong Exchanges and 
Clearing Limited ('HKEC'). The entire thrust of the reform is 
to integrate the securities system into a single unified whole in 
the form of a 'one-stop shop'. The completion of this reform 
will be the listing of the shares of the company on the stock 
exchange for trading and wider public ownership.
INTERNET TRADING ISSUES
... the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong has announced that it is 
aiming to upgrade the operating mechanism of its trading 
system in 2000 to process authorised trades from the Internet 
and mobile phones. ... Internet trading is not as yet a fully 
developed area, so that when for example a system crashes, 
unresolved legal questions arise relating to clearing and 
settlement issues as to who is responsible if a trade or 
quotation was delayed or interrupted.
The members of both the futures exchange and the stock 
exchange have voted heavily in favour of this government reform 
initiative for merger and demutualisation. The next step of the 
demutualisation process is to make the necessary legal 
amendments; the Hong Kong Government is determined to 
implement these reforms swiftly and it has targeted the listing to 
be ready by September 2000. Adopting this consolidated market 
structure will help to streamline the fragmented market 31
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segments and market functions of the industry, and the 
economies of scale in terms of market operational efficiency. 
Furthermore, establishing a central organisation would facilitate' o o
the development of more consistent and concerted macro- 
market strategies in meeting global and external challenges.
Unlike the present system, the ownership of the new 
company will be separated from trading rights, which will be 
liberalised to give unrestricted access to the exchanges. It is also 
intended that the shareholders of the new company   the 
members of the Exchanges   will have a share in the profits and 
dividends. The approach of the reform is to transform the new 
organisational market structure into that of a corporate-business 
driven model. This separation of ownership in terms of shares 
and stocks from the trading rights of the individual stockbrokerso o
will make the stock exchange more professional by reducing 
conflicts of interest; there will be no exercise of vested interests 
by members trying to prevent outsiders from joining, as happens 
under the current structure. Thus, international financial 
players are encouraged to be stockbrokers in Hong Kong, 
thereby liberalising the Hong Kong system and allowing it to be 
even more competitive. All these reforms are also designed to 
prepare the system for Internet trading and 24-hour trading in 
the future.
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The Asian financial crisis clearly highlighted the deficiencies 
of Hong Kong's financial regulation in comparison with 
international financial standards. However, this does not justify 
throwing away the entire current regulatory framework. Thus, 
the legislative reform consolidates and updates in a composite 
Securities and Futures Bill the nine ordinances currently 
governing the securities and futures industry.
Financial legislation must seek to strike the proper balance 
between giving adequate regulatory supervision to ensure, as far 
as possible, a fair and level-playing field with adequate 
protection for investors while, at the same time, being careful 
not to stifle entrepreneurial flair through over-regulation. Under 
the reforms, the expertise and experience of the SFC, which has 
been enforcing all the ordinances since its inception, has its 
supervisory and investigative authority strengthened by a clearer 
statement of its objectives within the financial market 
framework. To balance the SFC's strengthened supervisory and 
investigative powers, the current Securities and Futures Appeals 
Panel will be upgraded to a Securities and Futures Appeals 
Tribunal, chaired by a High Court Judge and other well- 
respected practitioners. It will be able to review important SFC 
decisions, including all licensing and disciplinary decisions and 
also matters relating to intermediary supervision, investment 
products and registration of prospectuses.
Some areas of the SFC's work will be confidential and unable 
to be disclosed in the usual way. As a safeguard, a Process Review 
Panel will be instituted to review aspects of the SFC's internal 
operations, such as its investigative procedures. An independent 
Market Misconduct Tribunal will be set up to ensure effective 
enforcement measures against market manipulation and abuse 
(e.g. through insider dealing). There will also be a flexible and 
cost-effective licensing regime for market intermediaries aimed 
at streamlining the system and improving investor protection.
More adventurous, however, is the proposal to introduce new 
regulation for Internet trading. Currently there is no single set
of rules which can be used to control the ever-evoking range ofo o
facilities and services thrown up by automated trading systems. 
Therefore, the approach of the reform Bill is not to define 
'market' bv reference to a physical location but to provide that 
any unauthorised provision of a facility for bringing buyers and 
sellers together on a regular basis would constitute an illegal 
securities and futures market operation. This gives the SFC 
sufficient jurisdiction to take action against unsupervised 
financial activities wherever they may be based.
ENHANCEMENT OF MARKET 
INFRASTRUCTURE
The race to harness the latest and most sophisticated 
technology to administer the financial functions of the market is 
integral to the drive for reform in the financial markets. The 
Steering Committee on the Enhancement of the Financial 
Infrastructure has been set up for the specific purpose of 
advising on the best available systems for trading, clearing and 
settlement functions. Particular areas of reform include the 
introduction of a secure scripless securities market; it is 
intended to upgrade the financial systems to enable a one-stop 
shop facility so that there can be straight-through processing of 
financial transactions and a single clearing system for securities, 
stock options and futures transactions.
CONCLUSION
The jury is still out on the success of Hong Kong in achieving 
reforms to its securities and futures industry through the recent 
initiatives outlined above. Hong Kong is still an infant at self-o o
governance under the Chinese political concept of 'one country, 
two systems'. Given her chequered financial legislation track 
record, which may at best be described as reactive in nature in 
that legislative initiatives were carried out only in response to a 
crisis, it is clear that the old-style British non-interventionist 
approach pervades and is deeply entrenched in the Hong Kong 
administration. Indeed, this laissez-faire policy has been widely 
acknowledged as being one of the key elements in Hong Kong's
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success. As a result, calls for regulation have never sat 
comfortably with the psychology of both the people and the 
administration of freewheeling, fast-dealing Hong Kong. It has 
almost been a matter of pride that there should be little or no 
regulation in Hong Kong.
That the Financial Secretary should have spearheaded the 
three-pronged approach to the reform and consolidation of the 
securities and futures industry   and with the swift and 
overwhelming support of the industry   has been quite an 
encouraging sign. The reforms indicate a willingness to regulate 
the financial services industry as a whole, and to plan in 
anticipation of future trends. Good reforms are not necessarily 
measured by the speed of their implementation, but rather by 
the internal rationalisation of the complex competing 
interests. @
Amy N N Ang
Cur/ae 24 February 2000
